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ABSTRACT
Recent work has demonstrated that by monitoring the Real
Time Bidding (RTB) protocol, one can estimate the monetary
worth of different users for the programmatic advertising
ecosystem, even when the so-called winning bids are en-
crypted. In this paper we describe how to implement the
above techniques in a practical and privacy preserving man-
ner. Specifically, we study the privacy consequences of re-
porting back to a centralized server, features that are neces-
sary for estimating the value of encrypted winning bids. We
show that by appropriately modulating the granularity of
the necessary information and by scrambling the commu-
nication channel to the server, one can increase the privacy
performance of the system in terms of K-anonymity. We’ve
implemented the above ideas on a browser extension and
disseminated it to some 200 users. Analyzing the results from
6 months of deployment, we show that the average value
of users for the programmatic advertising ecosystem has
grown more than 75% in the last 3 years.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Every year, on average, 300 billions dollars are spend globally
in digital advertising [7] and its dominant segment is the pro-
grammatic ad-buying with 84.9% of the ad market in US [8]).
The Real Time Bidding (RTB) auctions are the backbone of
this programmatic ad-buying ecosystem and there digital
advertisers can bid for winning an “impression”, i.e., the right
to display their advertisement on part of the real estate of
a web-page rendered by the browser of a user. Following a
real-time auction, the winning bid is communicated via RTB
and is proxied through the browser of the end user to ensure
the winning bidder that the ad they were charged for was
correctly rendered. This exact notification channel opens
up the way to estimating the value of individuals for online
advertisers, by tallying up their winning bids.
The work of Olejnik et al. [18] monitored the RTB traffic
to compute detailed analytics on the advertising value of
different individuals. Following up on this work, Papadopou-
los et al. [21] showed how to compute such analytics even
when winning bids are encrypted. Specifically, by running
purpose-built probe campaigns, they obtained the necessary
ground truth to train classifiers that use features of users and
auctions to estimate the values of encrypted winning bids.
The above mentioned work used data from a mobile proxy
and analysed them offline to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the method. A corresponding online system was sketched
but was not implemented beyond the mock up stage.
In this paper, we present YourAdvalue: a first-of-its kind
full fledged system that allows users to know how much
money the programmatic advertising ecosystem pays to
show them ads. By leveraging the methodology of previ-
ous work [21], YourAdvalue takes into account both cleartext
and encrypted winning bids (or charge prices). An impor-
tant component of this methodology is the ability of the
users to contribute with the ad prices they receive along
with auction’s metadata, thus allowing the system to re-train
its classifiers and improve its accuracy on estimating the
encrypted prices. To preserve the privacy of this operation,
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YourAdvalue anonymizes data before transmission and ap-
plies feature aggregation to achieve minimal surprisal rate.
Contributions. In summary, this paper makes the following
main contributions:
(i) We design YourAdvalue: a full fledged service involving
an end-user part, in the form of a browser extension and a
corresponding back end based on the methodology of pre-
vious work [21]. Our system is the first to our knowledge
practical tool for enhancing the transparency of the ad
ecosystem over RTB regarding the pricing dynamics and
how the user’s personal data affect the cost advertisers
pay to deliver them ads.1 YourAdvalue allows its users to
contribute with their ad prices and metadata and help the
trained classifiers to remain up-to-date and accurate.
(ii) We deploy, and provide open source2 our system, which
consists of a remote server and a browser extension3. By
providing publicly the browser extension on Google Web
Store the last 6 months we were able to collect data from
200 users that opted-in to contribute with their data which
we analyze. Results of this analysis show that the ad prices
have increased the last 3 years by 75% and that advertisers
pay for younger users.
(iii) We describe the possible re-identification attack scenarios
an attacker could launch against the back-end of our sys-
tem in an attempt to reconstruct the reporting sessions
of individual users. In addition, we present how YourAd-
value protects the privacy of the reported user data by
scrambling them locally on the browser extension before
transmission. Finally, we evaluate the impact of the gran-
ularity of the reported data on the k-anonymity of users
and we study how the different data anonymization levels
impact the utility of the reported data and thus the final
estimated prices.
2 BACKGROUND ON RTB
A Real-Time Bidding (RTB) auction is a programmatic, in-
stantaneous type of auction, where a publisher’s advertising
inventory is bought and sold on a per ad slot basis. During
an RTB instantaneous auction, advertisers place bids for an
ad slot in a publisher’s website and the one with the highest
bid gets to render its ad on the user’s display. RTB is more
efficient in terms of revenue than the traditional static ad-
buying for both the advertisers and the publishers. In RTB
auctions there are six key role players: the publisher, the
advertiser, the Supply-Side Platform, the Ad-exchange, the
Demand-Side Platform and the Data Exchange Platform.
1A similar tool has been developed for advertising within Facebook but it is
much more limited in scope than ours. See Related Work for details.
2https://youradvalue.tid.es:2222/
3Available for the majority of the most popular web browsers: Google
Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, and Brave.
Winning Price Notification URL
cpp.imp.mpx.mopub.com/imp?ad_domain=mobileacademy.com&
ad_id=...&adgroup_id=...&adunit_id=...&ads_creative_id=...&
auction_time=1420072833&bid_price=1.17&bidder_id=...&
bidder_name=PocketMath&campaign_id=...&charge_price=0.95&
country=ESP&currency=USD&impression_id=...&latency=0.021&
paid=0&pub_id=...&pub_name=Outfit7&pub_rev0=7303147477182482&
request_id=...&response_id=1420072832890&units=0&adgroup_type=
marketplace&adgroup_priority=9
Table 1: Real world example of a RTB price notification URL
with theADXofMopub and thewinningDSPof PocketMath.
True IDs are omitted for space efficiency.
2.1 A typical RTB auction
A typical transaction for an ad-slot begins with a user visiting
a website. This triggers a bid request from the publisher (or
SSP) to an ADX, usually including various pieces of user’s
data (e.g., interests, demographics, location, cookie-related
info, minimum acceptable price, etc.). Then, multiple DSPs
programmatically submit their impressions and their bids in
CPM (i.e., cost per thousand impressions [11]) to the ADX.
All bids are sealed so every participant places only one bid
for a particular ad-slot, this allows the RTB auction to finish
within milliseconds (the entire RTB protocol usually runs
in around 100 ms). The ad slot goes to the highest bidder
and its impression is served in the user’s display. The charge
price for the ad slot is the second higher price following the
Vickrey auctions [26]. The main advantage of this type of
auctions is that forces all bidders to have their bids truly
reflect on what they think the value of the ad slot should be.
Note that minimum acceptable price defined by the publisher
can act as the second price in an auction, if the second highest
bid price falls below it.
2.2 Charge price notification
When an ADX selects the winning bid of an auction, the
corresponding bidder must be notified about its win to log
the successful entry and the price to be paid to the ADX. This
happens with a notification message (or notification URL or
simply nURL) conjoined with the price, piggybacked in the
ad-response. This nURL passes through the user’s browser
and acts as a call-back to the DSP. This ensures the DSP that
the winning impression was indeed delivered (the callback
is fired soon after the impression is rendered on the user’s
device), and also gives the opportunity to drop a cookie on the
user’s device. The nURL includes the winning DSP’s domain,
the charge price, the impression ID, the auction ID and other
relevant logistics (see Table 1 for some examples). In this
present work, we monitor such nURLs and we study the
prices embedded in them, as well as how they associate with
the users’ browsing behavior and other personal information.
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2.3 Estimation of encrypted charge prices
Major ad-companies like Doubleclick tend to encrypt impor-
tant information like charge prices and thus way they ensure
the integrity of the reported information and avoid the pry-
ing eyes of competitors. Olejnik et al. in [18] assumed that
the encrypted prices are following the same distribution with
the cleartext ones. After observing an increase on the number
of ad-companies that were using encryption, Papadopoulos
et al. in [21] designed a methodology to estimate the value
of the encrypted prices. Specifically, authors analyze a large
dataset of real users to detect RTB traffic and extract a set
of both encrypted and cleartext prices along with their user
and auction related information (e.g., geolocation, time of
day, user interests etc.). Then, in order to assess possible
differences between the distribution of encrypted and clear-
text prices, they conduct their own probing ad-campaigns
and collect ad prices of both types. Contrary to the previous
study [18], they show that encrypted ad prices are (1.7×)
more expensive than the cleartext ones.
By using this ad-campaign data as ground-truth and fea-
tures like user geolocation, time of day, day of week, ad-slot
size, user device, user interest, authors train a Random Forest
classifier that can estimate the value of an encrypted price
with an accuracy of 82%. This trained model, could then be
shipped to the user’s end to allow them estimate at real time
the monetary cost advertisers paid per delivered ad. In this
work, we design, build and provide publicly YourAdvalue:
a system which leverages this methodology for encrypted
prices and we describe how we preserve the privacy of the
user (and what is the trade-off on data utilization), when
they decide to contribute with their data. This data contri-
bution, allows the trained model to get updated and address
potential time-shifts of charge prices.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we elaborate on the guiding principles behind
the design of the system, the various components it needs and
the functionalities they need to execute to compute correctly
this cost, while delivering a proper end-user experience.
3.1 Guiding Design Principles
Wegroup the design principles into three classes: user-related,
system-related and ad-related. The user-related principles
are summarized as follows:
(i) Simple to understand. The tool should display metrics
and visuals that are simple to understand by users who
are neither tech- nor privacy-savvy.
(ii) Unhampered user experience. The tool should be easy
to install and not degrade the user’s existing Web experi-
ence. This means it should not change a webpage’s appear-
ance, it should not slow down the loading of a webpage,
Metadata 
Sharing
(optional)
Plugin Database
Store for further 
analysis
Web request inspection for 
advertisement identification 
and meta-data extraction  
WebRequest Inspector
Applies advertiser list
User 
Notification
Browser + Plugin
Proxy
Fig. 1: Overview of the YourAdvalue architecture. The user
contacts the publisher’s website and the extension inspects
all the webRequests to find any possible advertisement. In
case of an advertisement the extension extract the relative
to it metadata, anonymize them and send them in a proxy
which forwards them to the server, for storage and further
analysis. In the same time it notifies the user about the price
extracted from the ad.
should not affect the network traffic induced by a web-
page, and should use minimum of computing resources
on the user’s device.
(iii) Preserve user anonymity. The tool should not, in any
case, leak sensitive information that could help an entity
to re-identify the end-user on the Web.
The system-related principles are summarized as follows:
(i) Transparency. The tool’s operations and functionality
should be transparent and an end-user or engineer should
be able to audit the tool and its functionalities.
(ii) Scalability. The tool’s system architecture should be able
to scale to accommodate thousands of users without any
problem.
(iii) Fault tolerance. The tool should continue to function
even after encountering unexpected behaviour, without
the need of user interaction andwithout causing errors/crashes
to the user’s browser.
(iv) Privacy-by-design. The tool should allow users to opt-in
to reporting metadata from ads detected, but in a privacy-
preserving fashion. That is, the data transmitted from the
tool should not expose the user’s identity.
The ad-related principles are summarized as follows:
(i) Real-time operation. The tool should operate in real
time and be able to inform the user of updated measures
as soon as new RTB ads are detected.
(ii) Generality of RTB detection. The tool should be able
to detect RTB-related ads regardless if they are delivered
in regular webpages (e.g., news websites) or closed-up
publishers (e.g., social networks).
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(iii) UntamperedRTBad-protocol.The tool’s detectionmech-
anism should be simple and should not tamper with the
RTB protocol responsible for the impressions logistics.
(iv) RTB price detection. The tool’s detection mechanism
should be able to detect and consider both encrypted and
cleartext prices included in the RTB nURLs.
3.2 System Components & Functionalities
Following these guidelines, we design the system and its
various components. In particular, the system has two main
components: 1) the end-user client (web browser extension),
2) the web server (running behind a web proxy). Figure 1
illustrates an overview of the system’s architecture. In the
next paragraphs, we explain each of these components and
how they fulfil the desired properties listed above. The ex-
tension side is written in a few thousand lines of JavaScript
and it’s available for all major browsers. Additionally, the
YourAdvalue extension can be inspected at the end-user side,
as it runs on the user’s browser.
3.3 User Interface & Input
For the end-user client to adhere with the user-related prin-
ciples, we opt for building a browser extension which allows
easy access to the user’s browsing sessions, can provide
an easy to use UI, and can perform network traffic inspec-
tion without interfering with the normal operation of the
website under visit. The web browser extension executes a
web-request inspector, which analyses the incoming and out-
going network traffic of a website and detects RTB-related
requests (nURLs). An example of this user interface (UI) can
be seen in Figure 2.
This UI is simple and intuitive and was designed with the
help of UX experts. In this UI, the user is prompted to indi-
cate (if they want) their gender and age range. Furthermore,
it displays to the end-user various simple metrics such as the
total cost computed for the said user since the tool’s installa-
tion, as well as the cost of the user for the current session.
The RTB ad detection and ad-related metadata extraction
methods are described in the next paragraphs. The design
of the extension is light and its operation was tested with
hundreds of different websites to confirm that it does not hin-
der the normal loading or operation of each website. Finally,
it provides the user button to opt-in/our from anonymous
metadata reporting at any time.
3.4 Web Server & Database
At the back-end, the web server receives the anonymous
metadata reported for further analysis. Upon arrival, the
data are shuffled with the already collected data to break any
relationship of the reported data with their original users.
The collected data are subsequently cleaned and modelled, to
Fig. 2: The web browser extension user interface. The exten-
sion consists of 4 different components: (i) the gender and
age fields which are user-specified and optional, (ii) the pie
chart which displays the type of ads a user encounters in
a nice format, (iii) the statistics field, where all time and
session information about the ads are displayed, and (iv)the
menu, where the user can tune the extension.
enable the creation of an updated decision tree (DT) model
for the encrypted prices (as described in [21]). The updated
DT is then sent at frequent intervals to the user clients. For
this transmission, the tree must be serialized using a proper
and agreed structure (e.g., XML format) and deserialized at
the browser extension.
3.5 RTB ad detection & price extraction
nURL detection. The browser extension analyses all net-
work traffic outgoing from the browser to detect all RTB-
related requests. For each request leaving the browser, the
extension collects metadata to check if it is a nURL about
an ad. To detect such requests we employ the webRequest
API, which is common and available in both browsers we
support. In particular, we create a listener using the event
onBeforeRequest, an event which is triggered when a request
is about to be made. The goal is to detect RTB nURLs; we
don’t want to block or redirect the nURLs and we don’t want
to tamper the RTB protocol nor the user experience.
DSP matching. After the tool catches an outgoing request,
it checks if it is a nURL or not, by comparing the destination
to a set of known DSPs (Figure 3). If it does not match with
any of the DSPs, it is allowed to pass. If it is, we consider it a
potential notification URL and extract the metadata related
to it (i.e., all http variables and values accompanying them).
Price extraction.We then check if there is a possible price
keyword in the nURL’s metadata, and if this keyword is
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Advertiser?
YES
Cleartext?
NO
Request
NO
(Request)
YES
(Request)
Accumulate
Total user’s 
value
Prediction
(Request)
Prediction 
using the 
DT
WWW
Price
Keyword?
YES
NO
(Request)
Fig. 3: The extension checks if the request corresponds to a
knownadvertiser and if the price is encrypted or cleartext. If
it’s not a known advertiser, it is let through. If it’s cleartext,
the tool extracts the value of the ad and adds it to the user’s
total ad-cost. If it’s encrypted, the tool applies a decision tree
model to infer its value before adding it to the user’s total ad-
cost.
correlated to the nURL’s advertiser. The argument here is
that each advertiser or DSP is associated with a specific
keyword used in the RTB. Therefore, if the price keyword
does notmatch the typical keyword used by the detected DSP,
it is considered false positive and it is let through. However,
if the price keyword matches what the DSP uses, the tool
extracts the associated price value.
Encrypted vs. cleartext prices. By leveraging methodol-
ogy of previous work [21], the extension is able to detect
both cleartext and encrypted RTB prices (i.e., if the price is
numeric or alphanumeric). If the value is numeric (cleartext),
it is normalized from CPM or micros to US dollars and is
added to the user’s total ad-cost. Otherwise, the tool applies
the provided Decision Tree classifier to estimate the ad’s
value, and then it is added to the user’s total ad-cost.
Encrypted price inference with DT model. Classifying
an encrypted price from a nURL is not a trivial task. First,
before the tool even detects a nURL, the tool needs to load
the DT model provided by the web server. The model is con-
structed in the web server and exported as an XML file which
is rolled out with the extension. The extension parses this
XML file and creates an internal representation of the model
that the server had created. We choose to embed (or preload)
the DT model in an XML representation inside the extension
for two reasons: (i) the DT does not change very frequently
and can be preloaded with an existing version of the DT, and
(ii) to reduce the number of requests done from the exten-
sion to the server to bare minimum. Whenever the DT is
updated from the server, which does not happen frequently,
the extension receives it in the form of an update. For the
actual prediction of the price, we implemented a lightweight
and efficient function that parses the DT and reports back
Feature Feature Description
Gender User’s chosen gender.
Age User’s chosen age.UserInformation Location User’s current location.
Time Of Day Time of the day an ad was detected
Day Of Week Day of the week an ad was detected.
Cookie Syncing Cookie Synchronization detected.
Browsing
Information
DoNotTrack DoNotTrack flag enabled/disabled.
Ad Format Impression’s size in display.
Winner DSP The DSP that won the auction.
Category Topic category of 1st party domain.
Price Keyword Keyword with the RTB ad-price.
Advertisement
Information
Price Value RTB price detected in the nURL.
Table 2: Metadata that the data-contributing users send to
the web server for model update and further analysis.
the price prediction, so it does not interfere with the user
experience, nor slow down the user’s internet browser. In
case the features’ values extracted cannot be matched to
the DT model, the extension uses a rolling average of the
cleartext prices as an estimation of the given encrypted price
that could not be inferred.
Feature extraction.When an encrypted price is detected,
the tool extracts the features that the DT requires to make
the value inference of the price. For the feature extraction
process, we collect metadata about the publisher and the
detected ad. These features are provided to the prediction
function to perform the inference. More details on the feature
extraction are provided in the next paragraphs.
3.6 Ad-related feature extraction
Location extraction. For the location extraction we use an
online API. By making a GET request over a secure channel
(HTTPS), the extension obtains and stores the user location
on country level. The location is stored in the client for the
whole session (as long as the user keeps the browser open,
does not restart the extension, etc.). In this manner, we keep
low the requests and the network resource needs.
Ad-format extraction. After analysing several nURLs, we
were able to create a list containing keywords which corre-
sponds to the width and height of ads. Based on that list, we
examine the nURLs’ parameters for any possible matches
that are then stored in the price features.
Cookie Synchronization extraction. Except from detect-
ing RTB, we are interested in detecting if a user is being
tracked by a 3rd-party entity. To achieve that, we again
employ the webRequest API and in particular, the onBefor-
eRequest event. We attempt to detect if user identifiers are
sent from the publisher’s webpage to other hostnames. We
first load all the cookie identifiers stored in the user’s browser,
discarding session cookies and those with values less than 10
characters because most of times they have values unrelated
to user identifiers. For each request from a tab, we check if a
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user identifier is present in the URL and if that URL is sent
to a tracker. Also, we make sure that the URL detected is not
from the same domain that the user is currently visiting in
that tab. Our method is able to detect a user identifier if it
is included in the URL’s parameters values or as part of the
URL path. When we detect such tracking from a 3rd-party,
we store the information in a binary flag, indicating that user
tracking with cookie synchronization took place in a specific
tab to a specific domain.
IAB category extraction. In order to extract the IAB cat-
egory for each 1st party, we created a list with a mapping
between websites and their IABs. We choose to include only
very popular websites, so we could keep the list small so the
extension would be lightweight. This list contains the top
500 Alexa sites. When the user visits a website, we extract
the 1st-party domain and compare it to the list entries. In
case we have a match, we report the IAB found, otherwise
we report “not specified IAB”.
3.7 User- & ad-related metadata reporting
As mentioned earlier, YourAdvalue allows users to contribute
with their data like ad-prices and auctionmetadata. In Table 2,
we list the metadata that are reported to the server. The list of
features is carefully selected to reflect the needed features for
the DT modelling to happen at the server side. It also enables
further analysis of RTB prices, how they evolve through time
and if the advertisers target particular user categories based
on their demographics (e.g., gender, age etc.).
Being very cautious to preserve the user anonymity and
privacy, the data reported do not include any user identifiers
or other PII. Also, they are anonymized in the client side be-
fore they are sent to the server. Each feature can be reported
at different granularities. However, one crucial question in
this work is what is a sufficient granularity for a given feature
to allow effective price modelling, but not compromise user
anonymity? In Section 5, we elaborate on the aggregation
methods possible for the given features, and the guarantees
or limits on anonymity they can offer to the reporting users.
Also, in order to overcome the problem of an honest but
curious server trying to re-identify the sender, each exten-
sion reports its data at random times throughout the day
and week. Because of this induced randomness, reports may
delay from several seconds to days after they are created, be-
fore leaving the user’s browser. Therefore, the server cannot
identify a user based on the rate of its reports, since report-
ing from different users gets mixed-up while being received
at the server side. In Section 5, we also investigate various
possible threats on anonymity of the users reporting such
data, and how the system’s design can protect them from
such de-anonymization attacks.
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Fig. 4: RTB price distribution on the two datasets from 2015-
2016 and 2019.
4 RTB PRICE EVALUATION
In this section, we perform a price analysis to observe how
the RTB ad prices change over time. To do this analysis, we
use a previously collected dataset from [21], and the data
collected from YourAdvalue. The first dataset is larger and
contains RTB ad metadata from the year 2015-2016. It con-
sists of about 80k ads from 810 users, and each entry contains
several different features. The second dataset was collected
with the YourAdvalue and it is from 2019. It consists of about
3600 ads from 200 users for a period of 6months. YourAdvalue
collects similar metadata to the ones in the 2015-2016 dataset,
so we can directly compare the price distributions for the two
time periods. Also in contrast with previous datasets, we col-
lect anonymized demographics from our users to study their
association with RTB prices, something not done before.
In Figure 4, we compare the CDFs of RTB prices for the
two time periods. We observe that the median price in the
newest dataset is 0.51 CPM, whereas in the older dataset it
was 0.29 CPM, pointing to a 75% increase in RTB prices in a
3-year period. In the same way, we observe that the top 5%
of RTB prices of the new dataset are > 5.2 CPM, compared
to 3.7 CPM for the older dataset.
Next, we compare the two datasets in basic dimensions
such as day of the week, time of day and IAB category of
visited publisher. In Figure 5, we compare the prices found
for each day of the week, between the two datasets. For the
dataset of 2015-2016, we observe a relatively stable distri-
bution for each day with a median value around 0.3 CPM.
In contrast, in the dataset of 2019, we do not capture a sta-
ble trend. From Sunday to Friday the median prices tend to
be between 0.3 and 0.6 CPM, but on Saturday the median
price peaks to 2.9 CPM. Overall, we see an increase in prices
advertisers pay in 2019 compared to the ones 3 years before.
Similarly, when studying the prices paid by advertisers
and the time that the ad was displayed (Figure 6), we see that
advertisers tend to spend more as the day goes by, with a
peak in the early afternoon slot of 15:00-18:00. Regarding the
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Cookie Synchronization.
prices paid per IAB category of the publisher, in Figure 7 we
observe that in 2019 the prices are indeed higher, but in most
cases the median prices are relatively close. This means, that
advertisers haven’t increased with the years the budget they
spend for the different types of IAB categories.
Next we focus on some demographics of our user for 20194.
In Figure 8, we see the prices paid by advertisers based on
the age of the users. We observe that advertisers are willing
to spend higher prices for younger users. In particular, for
users in the age group of 25-34, the median price was 0.52
CPM compared to the median price of 0.32 CPM for the user
group of age 35-44. Also, for the younger group of users,
advertisers are willing to pay as high as 4.0 CPM, whereas
in the older group the maximum reaches 1.85 CPM.
In Figure 9, we study the prices advertisers spend on users
located in different countries. We observe that for Spain
and Greece the median values are relatively close but the
maximum price advertisers are willing to pay is 4× higher in
Spain (2.8CPMvs. 0.7CPM). In Switzerland themedian value
is 2.2 CPM and can reach as high as 4 CPM, when in Cyprus,
the median value is 5.7 CPM. Cookie Synchronization is
a very important technique for user data sharing, tightly
connected with the ad auctions [2, 18]. However, as shown
4We cannot compare with the older data since these demographics were
not captured there.
in Figure 10, the existence of prior CS has no impact on the
charge prices.
5 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In order for YourAdvalue to accurately estimate encrypted
charge prices, it requires data from the users in order to have
its pricemodelling engine up-to-date with the current pricing
dynamics in the ad-ecosystem. Given the system’s principle
for privacy-by-design, YourAdvalue needs to preserve the
privacy of the users that opt-in to data contribution against
re-identification attacks after a possible data-breach or a
malicious server controller.
In this section, we first elaborate on the possible threats
that could expose a user’s identity, and allow an attacker to
link the user to his reported data (Section 5.1).We also discuss
howwe solve these threats, thusmaintaining user anonymity.
Next, we analyse the limits on user privacy by the features
reported by the tool (Section 5.2). To do that, we focus on
a larger, real-world dataset of 810 users used in previous
study [21] with the same features (Section 5.3). This dataset
allows us to study real users’ distributions of features, and
how user anonymity changes with feature aggregation. We
also study the inherent trade-off between feature aggregation
and price estimation accuracy (Section 5.4).
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5.1 User de-anonymization threats
Below, we discuss possible de-anonymization threats that
the system could face during data reporting, and how the
system design prevents them from materializing.
Threat 1: De-anonymization using users’ cumulative
online behavior. Most of the users have a consistent on-
line behavior, meaning that tend to visit the same web-
sites through their week (e.g., a user may consistently visit
cnn.com to read daily news, vs. another user who does that
via boston.com). This behavior makes users identifiable as al-
ready shown in [22]. We address this threat by not reporting
the 1st-party domains visited by users, but their correspond-
ing IABs instead [12, 17]. In this way, multiple different sites
can appear under the same IAB (e.g., all news sites will be
under the same IAB).
Threat 2: De-anonymizationusingunique 1st-party do-
mains. In addition to the previous threat, which considers
the cumulative activity of a user, there is a more subtle at-
tack also based on 1st-party domains. The 1st-party domain
that an ad was detected on, could be a private or sensitive
domain or a domain that other users are very unlikely to
visit. Let us assume that a user (Alice) visits such a private
domain (e.g., myorganization.org) and an ad is detected on
that domain. Let us also assume that the YourAdvalue in-
cludes in its report to the server that an ad was caught on
myorganization.org. Now, if a malicious user (Bob) gets ac-
cess to the stored data, and knows that Alice works for this
organization (myorganization.org), he could uniquely iden-
tify Alice. As explained above, this attack is addressed by not
reporting the actual 1st-party but only its IAB category.
Threat 3: De-anonymizationusing cookie synchroniza-
tion activity. Depending on their browsing behavior, differ-
ent users could have different trackers tailing them. There-
fore, it could be possible to distinguish a user by the vector
of trackers that track him. In fact, there could be cases that
specific users are tracked by very specific trackers, e.g., due
to special websites they visit, making them standing-out in
the crowd. We address this threat by not reporting the actual
trackers detected during a user’s browsing. Instead, we re-
port only if trackers were present when an ad was detected
and attempted a cookie syncing (binary signal).
Threat 4: De-anonymization using user-related identi-
fiers. In many cases, the nURLs contain user-related informa-
tion such as cookies or other user-specific IDs. An attacker
accessing the database could try to detect such ID-looking
strings and attempt to reconstruct user sessions by grouping
same ID related information. To address this threat, the tool
does not report back any user IDs or the complete nURL.
Instead, it extracts metadata such as the winner DSP, the
price keyword, the price value and the ad size, if available.
Threat 5: De-anonymization using user demographics.
Users can choose to report back some demographic informa-
tion (e.g., gender and age). This information may or may not
be truthful, and cannot point with certainty to a specific user.
However, if it is consistently reported, and if it is combined
with other public information, it may expose a user’s iden-
tity. To reduce the probability of such threat, we aggregate
these demographics in coarse-grained classes (e.g., the age
is reported in 10-year instead of 1-year bins).
Threat 6. De-anonymization using user’s IP address.
Even if the data reporting is done anonymously, an indi-
vidual’s identity could be compromised by grouping their
data reported throughout in the database. Two ways for this
to happen would be to: (1) find unique identifiers for users
and link database entries together (Threat 4), (2) link incom-
ing data based on IPs reporting them. For the 2nd scenario to
occur, we suppose that the server becomesmalicious and logs
the users’ IP addresses. To address this threat, and increase
user trust to the server, we employ previously proposed tech-
niques [15, 16] and use a web proxy that is not controlled by
the team. Instead it is controlled by other members of the
organization. Then, the proxy receives the data reports and
forwards them to the system’s server using the proxy’s IP
address. Also, in order to ensure that the proxy cannot read
the data reports, we use SSL between the YourAdvalue clients
and the server. This way, only the server can decrypt the
reports, and even if the proxy stored the clients’ IP addresses,
it has no way of knowing the contents of the reported data.
Threat 7: De-anonymizationusing grouped records into
user sessions. An attacker may attempt to de-anonymize a
user, by assuming that consecutive records of incoming data
could be reported by the same user. The system proceeds
to the following actions to reduce or even eliminate such a
threat: (1) As explained earlier in Sec. 3.7, the reporting client
does not send data for every detected ad, but instead collects
a set of records which it then shuffles and sends to the server
at random times. This strategy also breaks possible time link-
age between records, since they are not reported as soon as
they are created. (2) The receiving server randomly shuffles
the incoming data with the stored data frequently, depend-
ing on the amount of data stored. This enables the server
to break any possible sessions and relationship records may
have with each other.
5.2 User uniqueness via surprisal analysis
Overall, the system design can protect users’ anonymity by
removing identifiers or attributes that can contain unique
examples of users’ activity, reducing the granularity of re-
ported data (with respect to frequency of reporting or detail),
and randomizing the data reporting and storing to avoid the
possibility of linking records together into sessions. However,
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it is important to study the bounds of anonymity that can
be achieved, when the features reported back to the server
are taken into consideration together while attempting to
de-anonymize a user.
In this section, we formally investigate this problem. In
particular, we are interested to study what granularity of
reporting is low enough to protect the anonymity of each
user, while still maintaining full or partial utility of the re-
ported data. For this investigation, we employ two commonly
known tools to understand this trade-off. First, we study how
unique a user is, given a particular reporting setup (i.e., com-
bination of features and granularity classes). and (similar to
other works [6]) we estimate this by measuring the num-
ber of surprisal bits that such a setup achieves. Second, we
compute the number of users who are expected to be found
or collide in a given reporting setup. The second study is
a classic k-anonymity analysis, in which we measure how
many users have similar behaviour and are likely to report
the same combination of features and granularity classes. In
the next paragraphs, we offer these analyses of surprisal and
k-anonymity for the features considered in Section 3.7.
5.2.1 Background on Information Theory. In information
theory, given an event E with probability P(E), surprisal is
defined as:
I (E) = − log2 (P(E)) (1)
Surprisal is measured in bits, and the higher the surprisal the
more unique an event is. Something that is certain has no
surprisal (0 bits), flipping a fair coin is associated with 1 bit
of surprisal, winning the lottery is associated with 24 bits of
surprisal. In our case, higher surprisal of a user’s reporting
data means the user can be uniquely identified easier.
If the said event E is dependent on N independent at-
tributes or features (i ∈ N ), then the overall probability of
the event P(E) can be broken down and expressed as:
P(E) = p1 × p2 × . . .pi · · · × pN (2)
If we assume that each feature i has different discrete
classes, and they are equally likely to appear (i.e., they are
governed by a uniform distribution), then every feature i has
a probability:
pi =
1
# o f distinct classes o f f eature i .
In a more realistic scenario, an event E, or in our case ex-
perimental setup E (that dictates specific class for each of the
features), is dependent on N independent features that are
governed by real distributions. Thus, the above probabilities
are not equal for all classes of a given feature. Instead, for
class j of feature i we have:
pi j = PDFi (Ei j )
where PDFi () is the real (or observed) probability distribu-
tion function of feature i , and PDFi (Ei j ) is the probability
returned by this function for the event E to occur at class j
of this feature i , Ei j (i.e., the particular level or class that the
experimental setup takes (j) for the feature i). For example,
feature i could be the time of day, and the different classes
of this feature could be the 24 hours available (j). Then, the
probability of an ad to be detected at the 11am slot, is given
by the PDFi=t ime of day (Ei j=11am).
To compute the overall P(E) for a specific combination of
features and classes, we need to take into account all such
features i ∈ N and classes j:
P(E) = PDF1(E1j ) × · · · × PDFN (EN j ) =
N∏
i=1
PDFi (Ei j ) (3)
where: E = the experimental setup of interest, comprised of
a selected class j , for each feature Ei , PDFi (Ei j ) = probability
of E to occur, as computed from the PDF of feature i for its
class j, P(E) = overall probability of E to occur.
5.2.2 Uniqueness using UniformDistributions. Following the
assumption of a uniform distribution of classes of features
(Eq. 2), all the combinations of features have the same prob-
ability to occur in our dataset. This assumption allows us to
study the problem of reporting and define some baselines of
features and their classes that we could report. In Table 3 we
compute the theoretical surprisal bits of a system that has the
features mentioned earlier and are shown in individual rows
in the table. The granularity of reporting, i.e., the number of
independent and uniformly distributed classes is reported in
each column for each row.
We begin by assuming that the YourAdvalue client reports
back the features exactly as collected without any generaliza-
tion. This scenario is hypothetical, but can give us a baseline
understanding of what we are dealing with respect to sur-
prisal bits. We assume that the age ranges from 0 to 99 years,
the user could be from any of the 240 different countries of
the world and that the reporting is in 1-hour bins. We also as-
sume that the client reports back the 1st-party domains they
browse through (e.g., 500 distinct values) and the trackers
they have encountered and performed cookie synchroniza-
tion (e.g., 200 distinct values). The price keyword can take
only 1 distinct value because each DSP is using one keyword,
but the price value can obviously vary. Thus, we assume this
price value can take 200 distinct values. In this hypothetical
scenario, there is no aggregation so the surprisal, as expected
is really high (> 60 bits).
Next, we assume that the tool performs aggregation of the
distinct classes of some of the features, to explore a more
realistic setup. For example, by just grouping the age in 5 dis-
tinct ranges, we reduce the surprisal bits by 5. Grouping the
reported time of day in 3-hour intervals seems to have only
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a small impact to the overall surprisal rate. In contrast, by
eliminating the cookie synchronization DSP, and reporting
back only if CS took place (2 distinct values) greatly reduces
the overall surprisal by almost 7 bits. Also, if instead of re-
porting the 1st-party domain we report only 30 distinct IAB
categories, we reduce the surprisal by over 4 bits.
In the far right case, in which all possible features are
aggregated, we can effectively halve the initial surprisal rate.
But this can impact greatly the utility of our data. In this
extreme case, no actual value is sent. Instead, the client only
reports if the price was low, medium or high. This is the
same case with the ad format, where the client reports if
the ad was small, medium or large. Finally, instead of the
actual country, the client reports only a country zone (e.g.,
Central EU, North America, etc.). The combination of distinct
features and their impact on the surprisal rate can be seen in
detail in Table 3. From the previous threat analysis and the
computation of surprisal bits assuming uniform distribution
of classes, we can extract some lessons on what features can
be reported and with how many classes each.
5.3 Real-world data privacy analysis
Building on the previous theoretical analysis, we conduct an
anonymity analysis of these features on a real user dataset.
However, in this case, we employ the formula of Eq. 3, where
the probability of a class (or level) in a feature is no longer
uniform, but is computed using the probability distribution
function of the feature. The dataset used was the one pro-
vided by the authors of the study in [21] and consists about
80k entries from 810 different users, each entry containing
27 different features. Out of these 27, we selected the ones
that are reported back from the YourAdvalue as well, ending
up with a set of 8 features. Namely these features are: user
location, day of the week, time of the day, ad size, ADX in-
volved, IAB category for the 1st-party, price keyword and
price value. Based on the classes in each feature, we cal-
culate the probability of each different class. (due to space
constraints we show the probability distribution functions
for these features in Figure 20 in Appendix A).
We start our analysis by examining a pessimistic scenario,
which assumes an experimental setup where all features are
reported at their classes with lowest probability observed.
That is, we take the lowest probability class for each feature
and compute the surprisal bits of this scenario. Indeed, the
surprisal bits for a user who reports such unlikely event are
about 6 bits. Interestingly, this number is very close to our
previous theoretical worst case scenario, where no kind of
anonymization was applied.
Next, we proceed to analyze the scenarios that did happen
in the real dataset, and compute their surprisal bits. In Fig-
ure 11 (black line), we show the CDF of the surprisal bits for
Feature Number of classes
Gender 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Age 100 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Country 240 240 240 240 240 120 120 25 25
Time Of Day 24 24 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Day Of Week 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Cookie Sync 200 200 200 2 2 2 2 2 2
DoNotTrack 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
adFormat 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 3
winnerDSP 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
category 500 500 500 500 30 30 30 30 30
Price Keyword 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Price Value 200 200 200 200 200 200 50 50 3
Surprisal Bits 60.2 55.8 54.3 47.6 43.6 42.6 40.6 38.3 31.5
Table 3: Number of surprisal bits for different distinct
classes of each feature, assuming uniform distribution of ap-
pearance of each class, for each feature.
Feature Number of classes per feature
user location 184 26 26 26 26 26
day of week 7 7 2 2 2 2
time of day 6 6 6 2 2 2
ad size 17 17 17 17 3 3
ad exchange 149 149 149 149 149 15
cookie syncing 2 2 2 2 2 2
IAB category 25 25 25 25 25 25
Surprisal Bits 29.9 27.0 25.2 23.7 21.2 17.8
ML metric
AUC of ROC 0.858 0.854 0.820 0.798 0.798 0.786
F1 score 0.620 0.614 0.563 0.537 0.537 0.532
Table 4: Feature class aggregation vs. surprisal bits (assum-
ing uniform distribution of classes), and vs. performance of
ML modelling.
the observed setups. All setups have fewer than 37 bits, and
95% of the cases have fewer than 21 bits. Also, the median
setup has 12.5 bits. Indeed, someone could argue that the
high surprisal bit rate for a small portion of entries could
expose some users. We remind the reader that in the absence
of any sort of PII, the link to specific users can be difficult if
not impossible inside this database.
Similarly with the analysis for uniform distribution, we
can attempt to improve anonymity of users by performing
aggregation of features to fewer classes. We demonstrate
this effort in Table 4 and in Figure 11, in which we show
the CDF of the overall surprisal bits for the different setups
included in the real dataset, and different aggregation efforts.
Interestingly, when we perform aggregation for the different
features, we see a steady reduction of surprisal bits across all
cases, besides the location aggregation which is effective for
a portion of the ads. This is due to the fact that is such ads,
the locations are popular and summarizing them does not
have an impact in the surprisal rate. After all aggregations
of classes are applied, the surprisal rate of the median setup
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Fig. 11: CDF of surprisal bits after incremental feature aggre-
gation.
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Fig. 12: K-anonymity values on different scenarios of aggre-
gation, and with all features considered.
drops down to 7.7 bits from 12.5 bits and for the 95% case
drops to 13.7 bits from 21 bits.
We continue this investigation by performing a k-anonymity
analysis of this real dataset, to understand at what level it
is satisfied, based on the different classes and aggregation
performed. K-anonymity is used as privacy criterion in real
applications such as the “Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act” (FERPA) of USA [25], and the “Guidelines for
De-identification of Personal Data” of South Korea [14]. In
Figure 12, we show the CDF of the number of users who col-
lide in the same type of setup, when the features are reported
in a given set of classes. That is, the figure shows how many
users (k) match the same entry reported in the dataset (i.e.,
ad), with the same features and classes. We notice that the
median entry (ad) reported can be mapped to k=4–6 users,
and the minimum k-anonymity achieved is k=2 users.
We further consider a realistic scenario where the attacker
has limited access per ad detected, without any knowledge
of the user’s browsing behavior (i.e., does not have IAB cat-
egories reported). In this scenario, the attacker groups the
entries found in the dataset based on the features of loca-
tion, day of the week and time of the day (i.e., does not have
access to other features). In Figure 13, we see that in this
attack scenario and the different setups tested, a minimum
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Fig. 13: K-anonymity for different scenarios of aggregation
with no knowledge of user’s browsing behaviour.
k-anonymity of k=6 users is satisfied, and a median entry
(ad) can be mapped to k=35 users. In general, these scores are
within the range of k=3–10 reported in [13] and applied for
electronic health records, lending support to the applicability
in our scenarios as well.
5.4 User Anonymity vs. Price Modelling
We close this investigation by looking into the inherent trade-
off between aggregation of feature classes, and the modelling
of prices at the server using machine learning methods. We
use a random forest model and 4 equidistant classes for the
RTB prices detected, and measure standard ML performance
metrics: (i) AUCROC and (ii) F1-score for the different ag-
gregation levels of the available features, as examined in the
previous paragraphs. The results are shown in the bottom of
Table 4.We find that both metrics are not greatly impacted by
the aggregation performed: 8.4% decrease in AUC and 16.5%
decrease in F1 when comparing the no-aggregation scenario
(1st column) vs. the fully aggregated scenario (last column).
These results mean that the YourAdvalue can do aggressive
aggregation of features at the client side before reporting,
without affecting the performance of the ML model at the
server side.
6 RELATEDWORK
Papadopoulos et al. in [21] set out to explore the cost ad-
vertisers pay to deliver an ad to the user in the waterfall
standard and RTB auctions. In addition, they studied how
the personal data can affect the pricing dynamics. The au-
thors proposed a methodology to compute the total cost paid
for the user even when advertisers hide the charged prices.
Finally, they evaluated their methodology by using data from
a large number of volunteering users. According to their find-
ings advertisers, paid a total of around 25 CPM to deliver
ads to the average user across a year. In [18], Olejnik et al.
followed a similar approach. They detected RTB notification
URLs and extracted the value of the auctioned advertisement.
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They made an extensive study on the RTB ecosystem and
estimated the value of user’s private data based on the clear-
text price notification URLs. They found that the average
price of an ad is in the range of 0.0001$-0.004$, depending
on the user and the ad campaign.
In [9], authors use a dataset of users’ HTTP traces and
provide rough estimates of the relative value of users by
leveraging the suggested bid amounts for the visited web-
sites, based on categories provided by the Google AdWords.
FDTV [10] is a tool to inform users in real-time about the
monetary value of the personal information associated to
their Facebook activity. Although similar to ours in objective,
our approach is more general since it applies to all RTB-based
advertising whereas the methodology of [10] is obtaining
prices from the Facebook AdPlanner and thus is relevant
only for Facebook advertising. In a follow up work [4] , the
same group investigated if Facebook complies with the re-
cent GDPR. They concluded that Facebook labels 73% EU
users with sensitive interests and they estimated that a mali-
cious third-party could unveil the identity of Facebook users
that have been assigned a sensitive interest at a cost as low
as EUR 0.015 per user.
In [19], the authors used a heuristic mechanism to de-
tect information exchanged between advertisers through CS.
They concluded that 97% of the users are exposed to CS at
least once and that ad-related entities participate in more
than 75% of the overall synchronization. In [20] the authors
demonstrated how this technique may leak user’s cookie IDs
and browsing history to a snooping ISP even when user uses
TLS and secure VPN services. By probing the top 12k Alexa
sites they found 1 out of 13 websites exposing their visitors
to these privacy leaks.
Bashir et al. in [3], studied the diffusion of user tracking
caused by RTB-based programmatic ad-auctions. Results of
their study show that under specific assumptions, no less
than 52 tracking companies can observe at least 91% of an
average user’s browsing history. In [2], the same group tried
to enhance the transparency in ad ecosystem with regards
to information sharing, by developing a content agnostic
methodology to detect client- and server- side flows of in-
formation between ad exchanges and leveraging retargeted
ads. By using crawled data, they collected 35.4k ad impres-
sions and identified 4 different kinds of information sharing
behavior between ad exchanges.
[1] discusses the value of privacy after defining two con-
cepts (i) Willingness To Pay: the monetary amount users are
willing to pay to protect their privacy, and (ii)Willingness To
Accept: the compensation that users are willing to accept for
their privacy loss. Two user-studies [5, 24] have measured
how much users value their own offline and online personal
data, and consequently how much they would sell them to
advertisers. In [23], the authors propose “transactional” pri-
vacy to allow users to decide what personal information can
be released and receive compensation from selling them.
7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the design, implementation, de-
ployment and operation of YourAdvalue, a first-of-its kind,
full fledged system that allows any user, through a browser
extension, to know in real time how much money the RTB
ad-ecosystem pays to show him ads. We have been operat-
ing the system for the last 6 months and it has already been
used by 200 real users. During this time period, we collected
RTB-related metadata, and using a previously analyzed RTB
dataset, in this paper, we make the following main findings
regarding RTB prices and their evolution over time:
• In a period of 3 years, RTB prices increased by about 75%.
• Advertisers kept the same bidding policies regarding the
IAB category of a website over time.
• Advertisers are bidding more aggressively on Saturdays,
compared to the rest of the week.
• Prices increase during the day until afternoon (6am-6pm).
• Prices for younger users are higher than older users.
• Cookie Synchronization does not have an impact on the
price of an auctioned ad.
In addition, we performed a privacy evaluation of the
system, to identify possible threats against user’s anonymity.
We measured the limits of user anonymity with a uniqueness
study via surprisal and k-anonymity analysis. Finally, we
studied the trade-off of anonymity via feature aggregation
vs. performance of price modelling with machine learning
methods. In summary, the main takeaways from the privacy
evaluation of this tool were:
• YourAdvalue’s privacy-preserving design protects users
from typical and extreme de-anonymization attacks.
• With feature aggregation, the median surprisal bits under
various distributions of classes (uniform or real) can be
halved to 7.7, in comparison to no-aggregation scenarios.
• Location aggregation does not reduce user uniqueness as
much as other features (e.g., time of day or day of week).
• With feature aggregation, a median 30-45-anonymity can
be achieved.
• YourAdvalue’s client can do high feature aggregation be-
fore reporting with minimal impact on the ML price model.
We envision that in the future, the YourAdvalue tool will
be further used by many end-users, privacy researchers and
auditors, who can take advantage of its simple functionalities
to increase transparency in the RTB ad-ecosystem and its
obscure practices of user modelling and ad-costs.
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A APPENDIX
In Figure 20 we show the distributions of features and their
different classes (levels) extracted from a real user dataset
with RTB prices reported.
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Fig. 20: Distributions of features and their different classes (levels) extracted from a real user dataset with RTB prices reported.
